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G lobalization is making it increasingly easy for corporations to shift profits to low-tax countries. Modern technology has also made it simpler for wealthy individuals to move funds to undeclared bank accounts in offshore tax 
havens. Both issues have featured prominently in the news and global economic 
debates since the financial crisis, but the arguments tend to be based on relatively 
little empirical evidence.
Measuring the costs of tax havens to foreign governments is fraught with 
difficulties. However, balance of payments data and corporate filings show that 
US companies are shifting profits to Bermuda, Luxembourg, and similar countries 
on a large and growing scale. About 20 percent of all US corporate profits are now 
booked in such havens, a tenfold  increase since the 1980s. This profit-shifting is 
typically done within the letter of the law and thus would be best described as tax 
avoidance rather than fraud. I attempt to quantify its cost for government coffers 
by taking a fresh look at the most recent macroeconomic evidence and combining 
it in a systematic manner. Over the last 15 years, the effective corporate tax rate 
of US companies has declined from 30 to 20 percent, and about two-thirds of this 
decline can be attributed to increased profit-shifting to low-tax jurisdictions.
Wealthy individuals, too, use tax havens, sometimes legally—to benefit from 
banking services not available in their home country—and sometimes illegally—to 
evade taxes. A number of changes have sought, with some success, to curb that form 
of tax evasion over the last years. Yet the available evidence from Switzerland and 
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Luxembourg, as well as systematic anomalies in the international investment data 
of countries, show that offshore personal wealth is growing fast and that the bulk of 
it seems to be evading taxes.
To improve tax enforcement in the global economy of the 21st century, I make 
the case for a world financial registry. Such a registry would make it possible to 
both fix the loopholes of the corporate tax and make personal tax evasion much 
more difficult. I also discuss how some key challenges could, in the meantime, be 
addressed by reforms involving little to no international cooperation.
Multinational Corporations, Profit-Shifting, and Tax Avoidance
The corporate income tax is a key component of the tax systems of developed 
countries because it is one of the primary ways of taxing capital. In the United States, 
about one-third of total tax revenues at all levels of government came from capital 
taxes in 2013. Close to 30 percent of these taxes came from the corporate income 
tax ($350 billion), while the rest is accounted for by property taxes ($450 billion) 
and taxes on personal capital income and estates ($450 billion).1 In Europe, the 
average capital share of government tax revenues is 20 percent, which is less than in 
the United States because consumption taxes play a larger role; but like the United 
States, Europe’s corporate tax accounts for about one-third of its capital taxes 
(Eurostat 2014). Yet despite its important role, the practicality and enforceability of 
the corporate income tax is seriously challenged by globalization, and if the current 
trends are sustained it could well become relatively much less important in the next 
two or three decades.
The Three Pillars of International Taxation
In most high-income countries, the corporate income tax was born just before 
or during World War I at about the same time as the personal income tax (Ardant 
1972). That correspondence of timing is not a coincidence. Absent corporate taxes, 
personal taxation could be dodged or greatly postponed by people who would 
incorporate and shareholders who would keep their income within companies. 
The easiest way to prevent that scenario is to tax profits directly at the corporate 
level. The corporate tax is thus fundamentally a backstop, although it has also 
come to serve other purposes over time (as Bank 2010 shows in the US case). When 
corporate profits are paid out, the tax authorities recognize that shareholders have 
already been subject to corporate taxation and thus typically tax income from this 
source at a lower rate than earned income. In the United States, for instance, the 
1 These round-number figures are calendar year estimates that I computed using data from the Census 
Bureau, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Office of Management and Budget, and the OECD. 
The $350 billion corporate tax total includes state taxes ($53.6 billion) and the federal corporate tax 
($273.5 billion based on estimates for the fiscal year that ended on September 2013, about $300 billion 
on a calendar year basis). See the online Appendix to this article for complete methodological details.
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top federal income tax rate on capital gains and dividends paid by domestic and 
qualified foreign corporations is 20 percent, compared to 39.6 percent for ordinary 
income in 2013. In fact, the recognition that corporate profits are taxed twice was 
one of the key arguments put forward for reducing dividend taxation in 2003.2 
The 2003 dividend tax cut was originally set to expire in 2009 but has now been 
made permanent (Yagan 2014). In a similar vein, in Canada, Australia, and Mexico, 
when profits are paid out to shareholders as dividends, all corporate taxes previ-
ously withheld are credited against the amount of personal income tax owed. Until 
recently, many European countries had a similar imputation system. However, most 
of them now have adopted an approach similar to that of the United States: France 
stopped crediting corporate taxes in 2005, as did Germany in 2001 (for details of 
how high-income countries have taxed corporate profits since 1981, see OECD 
2013a, table C-II-4).
Corporate taxation is relatively straightforward in a closed economy, but it 
becomes more complicated when companies operate in different countries. US 
citizens are required to pay US taxes on all income, wherever it comes from. Because 
the corporate tax is essentially a prepayment for the personal income tax, US-owned 
corporations should also pay taxes on all their profits, whether they originate from 
US operations or abroad. But what is to be done when two countries seek to tax the 
same profits? In the 1920s, concerned with such double taxation, the League of 
Nations asked four economists to think about how best to avoid it (Bruins, Einaudi, 
Seligman, and Stamp 1923). They articulated three  principles, which since then 
have been the pillars of international taxation.
First, the corporate tax is to be paid to the source country’s government. If 
a US person owns a Brazilian coffee producer—call it Coffee Rio—then Brazil 
ought to levy the tax. In formulating that rule, the League of Nations group was 
heavily influenced by the tax laws of 19th-century Europe, when different sources of 
income—wages, rents, dividends, and so on—were all subject to what were known 
as different “schedular” taxes. To many economists back in the 1920s, corporate 
profits were just another type of income to which a tax was attached, and the ulti-
mate bearer of the tax burden did not matter much.
Source-based taxation works fine when a corporation owns a branch in another 
country that does all of its production and sales in that country. But imagine that 
Coffee Rio is the subsidiary of Coffee America, a US company whose activity involves 
importing and distributing Coffee Rio’s products in the United States. Where do 
Coffee America’s profits come from, the United States or Brazil? Here the League 
of Nations experts in the 1920s came up with a second principle known as “arm’s 
length pricing.” Both entities must compute their own profits separately, as if they 
were unrelated. Thus, Coffee Rio must compute its profits as if it sold its coffee at 
2 For example, here’s a comment from President George W. Bush (2003): “The IRS taxes a company 
on its profit. Then it taxes the investors who receive the profits as dividends. The result of this double 
taxation is that for all the profit a company earns, shareholders who receive dividends keep as little as 
40 cents on the dollar. Double taxation is bad for our economy. Double taxation is wrong.”
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the world market price, and the American parent must compute its profits as if it 
purchased the products of Coffee Rio at the market price for coffee. For decades, 
arm’s length pricing is how the profits of multinationals have been allocated 
across countries.
Third, the League of Nations group decided that international tax issues ought 
to be addressed not by a multilateral, global agreement, but at the bilateral level. 
As a result, since the 1920s countries have signed thousands of bilateral “double-tax 
treaties” that follow the general League of Nations guidelines of source-based 
taxation and arm’s length pricing, but differ in a myriad of specific ways. While 
international trade has been governed by a multilateral agreement since 1947—the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—to date no such multilateral 
treaty exists for corporate taxes.
The League of Nations experts foresaw many of the deficiencies of their plan. 
British economists were particularly skeptical (for a prime example, see Coates 1925). 
But just as the corporate tax principles were agreed upon in the 1920s, globalization 
retreated. From the Great Depression to the 1960s, foreign profits accounted for 
roughly 5 percent of total US corporate profits, as shown in Figure 1. So for almost 
half a century, the decisions of the League of Nations experts turned out to be 
mostly inconsequential, applying only to this low percentage of corporate profits.
The situation started changing in the 1970s, but slowly. It is only in the 
21st  century that a surge in international investments brought the problems to 
the frontlines. Globalization is back on a broader scale than in the late 19th and 
early 20th century, and the choices made by the League of Nations are coming back 
to haunt the tax authorities.
Treaty Shopping and Transfer Pricing
Each of the three core principles for international taxation of corporate earn-
ings agreed upon in the 1920s—source-based taxation, arm’s length pricing, and 
bilateral agreements—raises its own issues.
First, the choice of thousands of bilateral treaties over a multilateral agreement 
has created a web of inconsistent rules. Multinationals firms can exploit these incon-
sistencies to avoid taxes by carefully choosing the location of their affiliates—what 
is known as “treaty shopping.”
One prominent example is Google’s “double Irish Dutch sandwich” strategy, so 
named because it involves two Irish affiliates and a Dutch shell company squeezed 
in between. A similar strategy is used by other multinationals; in the case of Google, 
it was first analyzed by reporter Jesse Drucker (2010) and then by academics 
(for example, Kleinbard 2011, p. 707–714) and international organizations (for 
example, IMF 2013). It starts with Google US transferring part of its intangible 
capital—specifically, its search and advertisement technologies—to “Google Hold-
ings,” which is a subsidiary incorporated in Ireland, but for Irish tax purposes, 
it is a resident of Bermuda (where its “mind and management” are supposedly 
located). The transfer took place in 2003, a few months before Google’s initial 
public offering, and at the time presumably generated a taxable income for Google 
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in the United States. Google US had an incentive to charge less than the then-
current market value of its technologies, but we do not know if it was able to do so 
or if the arm’s length rules were strictly enforced—the purchase price is not public 
information. In any case, since Google’s market value increased enormously after 
its 2003 initial public offering, it is apparent that Google US was able—whether 
intentionally or not—to “sell” its intangibles to its offshore subsidiary for what, in 
retrospect, was a low price.
The Irish/Bermuda hybrid then created another Irish subsidiary, “Ireland 
Limited,” and granted it a license to use Google’s technologies. In turn, this 
subsidiary puts Google’s intangible capital to use by licensing it to all Google affili-
ates in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. (A similar strategy, with Singapore 
in lieu of Ireland, is used for Asia.) Google France, for instance, pays royalties to 
“Ireland Limited” in order to have the right to use the firm’s technologies. At this 
stage, the bulk of Google’s non-US profits end up being taxable in Ireland only, 
where the corporate tax rate is 12.5 percent.
The next step involves stripping the profits out of Ireland and making them 
appear to have occurred in Bermuda, where the corporate tax rate is zero percent. 
This is done by having “Ireland Limited” make a royalty payment to “Google Hold-
ings.” There are two potential obstacles here. Ireland, first, withholds a tax on royalty 
payments to Bermuda; to avoid this tax, a detour by the Netherlands is necessary. 
Figure 1 
The Share of Profits Made Abroad in US Corporate Profits
Source: Author’s computations using National Income and Product Accounts data.
Notes: The figure reports decennial averages (that is, 1970–79 is the average for years 1970, 1971, 
through 1979). Foreign profits include dividends on foreign portfolio equities and income on US direct 
investment abroad (distributed and retained). Profits are net of interest payments, gross of US but net 
of foreign corporate income taxes.
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
30% 
35% 
1930–39 1940–49 1950–59 1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000–09 2010–13 
%
 o
f U
S 
co
rp
or
at
e 
pr
o
ts
 
126     Journal of Economic Perspectives
“Ireland Limited” pays royalties to a Dutch shell company (“Google BV”)—which 
is a tax-free payment because Ireland and the Netherlands are both part of the 
European Union. The Dutch shell then pays back everything to the Irish/Bermuda 
holding—tax-free again because to the Dutch tax authorities the holding is Irish, not 
Bermudian. The second problem is that the United States, like other high-income 
countries, has a number of anti-avoidance rules—known as “controlled foreign 
corporations” provisions—designed to immediately tax income such as royalties 
paid by Ireland Limited to the Irish/Bermuda holding. However, in the US case, 
these rules can be avoided by choosing to treat “Ireland Limited” and the Dutch 
shell company as if they were not corporations but divisions of Google Holdings, 
a move called “checking the box” because that is all that needs to be done on IRS 
form 8832 to make this work.
The end result is that from the viewpoint of the United States tax authorities, 
“Ireland Limited” and “Google BV” do not exist, but for Europe they are real. For 
Ireland, “Google Holdings” is Bermudian but for the United States it is Irish. Playing 
tax treaties against each other—and in particular exploiting their inconsistent defi-
nitions of residency—Google thus generates stateless income, nowhere taxed in 
the year it is generated (Kleinbard 2011, 2012, 2013). In recent years, according to 
Google’s company filings, its effective tax rate on foreign profits has ranged from 
2 to 8 percent.
In the United States, contrary to what happens in most other OECD countries, 
when offshore profits are repatriated, they are taxed; the tax is at a corporate income 
tax rate of 35 percent with a credit for all foreign corporate taxes previously paid. 
In practice, the incentives to repatriate are weak because funds retained offshore 
can be used in various ways. One use is to purchase foreign companies—in 2011, 
Microsoft bought Skype for $8.5 billion, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
have been booming since then. Another use is to secure loans—Apple has issued 
dozens of billions in bonds to finance a large share buyback program. Yet a more 
extreme move is for a company to shift its head offices overseas by merging with a 
foreign corporation, what is known as a “tax inversion”—in 2014, Minnesota-based 
Medtronic announced plans to buy Dublin-based Covidien and convert into an 
Irish-domiciled entity. All of this makes it possible for US-owned firms to use their 
unrepatriated offshore profits without incurring US tax liabilities.
The issues raised by treaty shopping are compounded by the growing ability of 
multinational firms to choose the location of their profits, and thus exploit treaty 
inconsistencies, irrespective of where they produce or sell. A popular method to 
shift profits offshore is the use of intragroup loans, whereby subsidiaries in low-tax 
countries grant loans to subsidiaries in high-tax countries. Another method—
and according to a recent meta-analysis of the literature, the most important one 
(Heckemeyer and Overesch 2013)—is the manipulation of transfer prices, the 
prices at which companies exchange goods and services internally.
In principle, intragroups transactions should be conducted at the market price 
of the goods and services traded, as if the subsidiaries were unrelated. In practice, 
arm’s length pricing faces severe limitations. In the hypothetical earlier example of 
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Coffee Rio, imagine that it sells its output to Coffee America at artificially high prices 
to make the profits appear in Brazil (where the corporate tax rate is 25 percent) 
rather than in the United States (where the corporate tax rate is 35 percent). With 
billions of intragroup transactions every year, tax authorities cannot conceivably 
check that they are all correctly priced. Clausing (2003) finds compelling evidence 
of transfer mispricing by US firms: controlling for other variables that affect trade 
prices, US firms appear to export goods and services to their low-tax subsidiaries at 
relatively low prices, and to import from them at high prices.
More important, in many cases the relevant market prices simply do not exist. 
What was the fair market value of Google’s technologies when it transferred them to 
its Bermuda subsidiary in 2003 before Google was even listed as a public company? 
The issue is growing in importance, as a rising number of international transactions 
within international divisions of a single company—such as the sale of proprie-
tary trademarks, logos, and algorithms—are not replicated between third parties. 
Indeed, for a number of multinational companies, where the profits derive in part 
from synergies of being present across the globe, the very notion of arm’s length 
pricing is conceptually flawed. In this case, there is no clear-cut way to attribute a 
portion of its income to any particular subsidiary.
The last core problem of today’s international tax environment stems from the 
rule that profits should primarily be taxed in source countries. Absent that rule, there 
would be no point in trying to make profits appear as if they were earned in zero-tax 
Bermuda. Source-based taxation provokes two types of inefficiencies. First, it causes a 
wasteful expenditure of resources: multinational companies spend billions of dollars 
in treaty shopping and transfer pricing (the tax department of General Electric 
employs close to 1,000 individuals), and when tax authorities devote effort to curb 
avoidance practices, this in turn triggers even bigger corporate expenses. The end 
result is that non-tax-haven countries have lower tax revenues and welfare (Slemrod 
and Wilson 2009). Source-based taxation also gives firms incentives to move real 
activity—factories, headquarters, and workers—to where taxes are low.3 While many 
analysts worry about the costs of tax competition for real investment, the available 
evidence suggests that artificial profit-shifting has a much larger effect in reducing 
corporate income tax payments, and thus the focus on this article is on profit-shifting.
The Revenue Loss Due to Corporate Tax Avoidance by US-Owned Firms
Quantifying the government revenue losses caused by profit-shifting to 
lower-tax jurisdictions is fraught with difficulties. A number of attempts, in partic-
ular by Sullivan (2004) and Clausing (2009), rely on Bureau of Economic Analysis 
data on US multinational firm operations. Here, I take a different approach by 
3 Ironically, in a pure source-based tax environment, artificial profit-shifting and tax competition for real 
investments cannot be fought simultaneously. Every time the tax authorities attempt to limit shifting 
financial profits to Bermuda, it becomes more valuable for firms to relocate to Singapore or Dublin 
(Hong and Smart 2010; Johannesen 2010). This would not be the case in the reform scenario I describe 
later in the paper.
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drawing on national accounts and balance of payments statistics. One advantage of 
these data is that they do not suffer from the double-counting issues pervasive in 
US multinational firm operations data (as discussed in Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis 2013; Hines 2010a). In the balance of payments data, profits that pass through 
chains of entities in Bermuda, Ireland, and the Netherlands—like in the “double 
Irish Dutch sandwich” arrangement—are consolidated and counted only once, in 
such a way that $1 of foreign profit recorded in the balance of payments directly 
contributes to US national income.
Consider then the basic macroeconomic aggregates of the US economy in 2013. 
National income (that is, GDP minus capital depreciation plus net income received 
from abroad) is equal to $14.5 trillion. Of this, US corporate profits (net of capital 
depreciation and interest payments) account for 14.5 percent, or $2.1 trillion. “US 
corporate profits” should be understood as the profits of US-owned firms: they 
include $1.7 trillion of domestic profits, plus $650 billion of profits made by foreign 
firms owned by US residents, minus $250 billion made by domestic firms owned by 
foreigners. So 31 percent (650/2,100) of US corporate profits were made abroad 
in 2013. Where do the $650 billion of foreign profits come from? The balance of 
payments provides a country-by-country decomposition of this total, indicating that 
55 percent are made in six tax havens: the Netherlands, Bermuda, Luxembourg, 
Ireland, Singapore, and Switzerland (Figure 2). The use of tax havens has steadily 
increased since the 1980s and continues to rise. Moreover, the trend toward more 
Figure 2 
The Share of Tax Havens in US Corporate Profits Made Abroad
Source: Author’s computations using balance of payments data. See online Appendix.
Notes: This figure charts the share of income on US direct investment abroad made in the main tax 
havens. In 2013, total income on US direct investment abroad was about $500 billion. Seventeen percent 
came from the Netherlands, 8 percent from Luxembourg, etc.
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widespread use of tax havens by US-owned corporations shows no particular sign of 
slowing down.
As tax havens rose as a share of foreign profits (to 55  percent today) and 
foreign profits rose as a share of total US corporate profits (to about one-third), 
the share of tax havens in total US corporate profits reached 18 percent (that is, 
55 percent of one-third) in 2013. That is a tenfold increase since the 1980s, as shown 
by Figure 3. The high level of tax-haven profits is all the more remarkable given 
that many US-owned companies have no overseas activity at all. (The rapid increase 
during the financial crisis is due to the relative strength of offshore profits at a time 
when domestic profits collapsed.)
Considerable care is needed when interpreting balance of payments statis-
tics. These data do not reveal the real source of profits, but mainly the location 
of the holding companies involved in tax planning. Imagine that a US firm 
has an affiliate in France but this affiliate is owned through an Irish holding. 
In the US balance of payments, a lot of the income generated in France will 
get counted to Ireland, particularly if the French affiliate is a disregarded entity 
for US tax purposes under the “check the box” rules. One potential reason for 
having an Irish intermediary is that it can make it easier to avoid French taxes 
and facilitate deferral of US taxes. But the balance of payments statistics do not 
Figure 3 
The Share of Tax Havens in US Corporate Profits
Source: Author’s computations using National Income and Product Accounts and balance of payments 
data. See online Appendix.
Note: This figure charts the ratio of profits made in the main tax havens (Netherlands, Ireland, 
Switzerland, Singapore, Luxembourg, Bermuda, and other Caribbean havens) to total US corporate 
profits (domestic plus foreign).
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directly tell us how much the increased use of haven-based subsidiaries costs 
various governments.
To make progress on this issue, we need an estimate of the taxes paid by 
US-owned firms on the profits recorded in tax havens. Data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (2013, table  II-D-1, p.  46) suggest that US multinationals pay 
about 3  percent in taxes to foreign governments on the profits booked in the 
main low-tax jurisdictions displayed in Figure  2. Corporate filings are consistent 
with this result. In 2014, in Microsoft’s 10-K filing with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission,4 the firm disclosed that it had $92.9 billion of accumulated offshore 
profits—mostly from its subsidiaries in Puerto Rico, Ireland, and Singapore—and 
that it would face a $29.6 billion tax bill in the United States should it repatriate 
them—that is, a 31.9 percent rate. Since upon repatriation Microsoft would be able 
to deduct the foreign taxes previously paid from the 35 percent US corporate tax 
rate, this disclosure implies that the company paid at most 3.1 percent in taxes to 
foreign governments.
Microsoft also made it clear that it had no intention of repatriating the 
$92.9 billion, which it views as being “permanently reinvested outside the United 
States.” Admittedly, firms sometimes bring back a fraction of their overseas profits; 
others might do so in the future. But repatriations from low-tax jurisdictions 
are small today and seem unlikely to increase much in the near future, at least 
under current law. In 2004, Congress granted a repatriation tax holiday, letting 
multinationals bring their accumulated foreign profits back home if they paid a rate 
of 5.25 percent. Most companies used the tax holiday in 2005. Available evidence 
suggests that the holiday failed to increase domestic employment, investment, or 
research and development (Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes 2011). Moreover, it gave 
a boost to the share of the foreign profits of US-owned firms not only made, but also 
retained in tax havens (Figure 4). In 2013, 80 percent of the profits made in the 
key tax havens (that is, 45 percent of all foreign profits) were retained there, with 
20 percent brought back to the United States. Expectations of a new holiday may 
further increase this share in the near future.
Thus, not only do the profits made in the main havens bear negligible foreign 
taxes, they also mostly go untaxed by the IRS. Since these profits account for about 
20  percent of all US corporate profits, I conclude that profit-shifting to low-tax 
jurisdictions reduces the tax bill of US-owned companies by about 20 percent.
The Decline in the Effective Corporate Tax Rate of US-Owned Firms
Another way to assess the total government revenue losses is to study the evolu-
tion of the effective tax rate on the profits made by US-owned corporations all 
over the world. I compute the effective tax rate by dividing all the corporate taxes 
paid by these firms (to US and foreign governments) by US corporate profits, as 
recorded in the national accounts. (A more comprehensive analysis would take 
4 Available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789019/000119312514289961/d722626d10k.htm.
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account of the taxes then paid by shareholders when profits are distributed, so as 
to capture the effective rate on capital income).
Figure 5 reports nominal and effective corporate tax rates on US corporate 
profits by decade since the 1950s. The figure shows that the effective corporate tax 
rate is always below the US federal nominal rate. Indeed, not all corporate profits 
are taxable; when they are, the IRS definition of profits is usually narrower than 
that used in the national accounts; and companies can defer taxes by retaining 
income abroad. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 attempted to bring the two  rates 
in line—the nominal rate was reduced to 34 percent in 1988 in exchange for a 
base broadening. For about a decade, that strategy proved successful. But the 
situation changed in the late 1990s. From 1998 to 2013, the effective tax rate paid 
by US-owned firms has been reduced by a third, from 30 to 20 percent. If it had 
stayed constant, these companies would have, all else equal, paid $200 billion in 
additional taxes in 2013.
Not all of that decline should be attributed to increased tax avoidance. Although 
the nominal federal corporate tax rate has remained constant since 1998, tax reve-
nues have been affected in other ways. First, changes in US laws have narrowed the 
tax base. For example, corporations can deduct 9 percent of manufacturing income 
(broadly interpreted) from taxable profits since 2004, reducing the effective rate 
by about 0.4 percentage point (Government Accountability Office 2013a, p. 26). 
Figure 4  
US Corporate Profits Retained in Tax Havens
Source: Author’s computations using balance of payments data. See online Appendix.
Notes: This figure charts the ratio of US direct investment income reinvested in the main tax havens 
(Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Singapore, Luxembourg, Bermuda, and other Caribbean havens) to 
total US direct investment income abroad. The negative amount of reinvested earnings in 2005 means 
that, out of 2005 production, US firms repatriated more than 100 percent of the 2005 profits of their 
foreign affiliates (that is, the 2005 data point excludes repatriations from profits made prior to 2005).
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From 2001 to 2004 and again from 2008 to 2013, “bonus depreciation” was in force, 
altering the timing of depreciation deductions, although not their amount (Zwick 
and Mahon 2014). Some loopholes, on the other hand, have been plugged, such 
as tax cuts for profits derived from exports, which were found to contradict World 
Trade Organization rules.
Second, part of the large 2007–2010 decline in the effective tax rate owes to a 
drop in corporations’ realizations of capital gains and a rise in bad debt expenses, 
in both cases reducing taxable profits but not profits as measured in the national 
accounts. In recent years, revenues have also been affected by tax loss carryforwards 
from the 2008–2009 crisis. The net effect of the Great Recession, however, should 
not be overstated: in 2013, four years after the end of the recession, and despite a 
surge in profitability, the effective rate (20 percent) is still almost as low as in the 
2009 trough (18.4 percent).5
Third, the profits made by S-corporations are included in national accounts 
profits, although they are not subject to corporate taxes, so for these firms, the 
effective corporate tax rate is zero percent. S-corporations are firms with less than 
5 This is not apparent in Figure 5 because this figure displays decade averages. Yearly estimates of the 
effective corporate tax rate are available online in the Excel Data Appendix to this article. Yearly data can 
be volatile, in particular because of year-to-year swings in capital gains realizations; to analyze long-run 
trends it is preferable to focus on decade averages as in Figure 5.
Figure 5 
Nominal and Effective Corporate Tax Rates on US Corporate Profits
Source: Author’s computations using National Income and Product Accounts data. See online Appendix.
Notes: The figure reports decennial averages (for example, 1970–79 is the average for years 1970, 1971 
through 1979.) In 2013, over $100 of corporate profits earned by US residents, on average $16 is paid in 
corporate taxes to the US government (federal and states) and $4 to foreign governments.
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100 shareholders that pass their profits through to their owners to be taxed at ordi-
nary individual income tax rates (up to 39.6 percent in 2013). S-corporations’ profits 
have been rising from close to zero in the early 1980s to about 15 percent of US 
corporate profits in the late 1990s, and have remained at that level since then. Thus, 
S-corporations account for 2 percentage points of the fall in the effective tax rate 
from the 1980s to the 1990s, but they do not contribute to the 1998–2013 decline.
Last, foreign corporate taxes have tended to fall, but this reduction does not 
drive a wedge between the nominal and effective rate because lower foreign taxes 
are offset by lower tax credits when foreign profits are repatriated to the United 
States, and unrepatriated profits face almost no foreign taxes at all.
In sum, out of the 10  points decline in the effective tax rate between 1998 
and 2013, 2 to 4 points can be attributed to changes in the US tax base and the 
Great Recession, leaving two-thirds or more of the decline to increased tax avoid-
ance in low-tax countries. The cost of tax avoidance by US firms is borne by both 
the US government and the governments of other countries. Much of Google’s 
profits shifted to Bermuda are made in Europe; absent tax havens, Google would 
pay more taxes in France and Germany. On the other hand, some US corpora-
tions also use tax havens to avoid taxes on their US-source income. With national 
accounts data, it is hard to know which government loses most. In both cases, US 
shareholders win. Since equity ownership is very concentrated, even after including 
the equities owned by broad-based pension funds (Saez and Zucman 2014), so too 
are the benefits.
How can we reconcile the sharp decline in the effective corporate tax rate with 
the widely noted fact that corporate tax revenues have not declined as a share of US 
national income over the last 30 years—they still amount to about 3 percent today? 
The answer is that corporate profits have risen as a share of national income over 
time, from about 9 percent in the 1980s—when interest rates were high, and the 
capital share of corporate value-added low—to about 14  percent in 2010–2013.6 
This increase has offset the fall in the effective tax rate. In the United States like 
in other high-income countries, “capital is back” (Piketty and Zucman 2014)—but 
capital taxes, not at all.
Corporate Tax Reforms
There is no shortage of plans to fix the corporate tax. Some commentators 
argue that it should simply be abolished. A repeal would undermine the individual 
income tax, as people would shift income to companies and try to consume within 
firms; therefore in its most radical—and coherent—form, this proposal comes 
along with the suggestion to abolish the income tax as well and to tax consumption 
instead (Mankiw 2014). Toder and Viard (2014) suggest replacing the corporate tax 
by increased shareholder taxes: nonpublicly traded businesses would be taxed on 
a flow-through basis, just like S-corporations today; shareholders of publicly-traded 
6 See Supplementary Figure S.1 in the online Appendix available with this paper at http://e-jep.org.
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corporations would be taxed each year on the rise in the value of their shares, even if 
the gains have not been realized. However, as the authors acknowledge, the reform 
would raise only half the revenue of the current corporate tax, a tax cut that would 
primarily benefit rich households at a time when income and wealth inequality are 
rising; and since equity prices are very volatile, it would result in unpredictable tax 
bills. In fact, no country in the world has a well-functioning individual income 
tax and no corporate tax at all.
For those committed to keeping a form of corporate taxation, reform 
proposals differ in their willingness to reconsider the three pillars of international 
taxation: decentralized rules through bilateral treaties, arm’s length pricing, and 
source-based taxation.
A first class of reforms pushes for more harmonization of treaty rules. Advo-
cates acknowledge that the thousands of bilateral tax treaties have created scope for 
treaty shopping and transfer mispricing, but they remain committed to the princi-
ples of source-based taxation and arm’s length pricing. As one example, the OECD 
(2013b) has disclosed an ambitious “action plan on base erosion and profit shifting” 
along those lines. In recent years, one of the main steps taken by governments has 
been to strengthen existing transfer pricing rules by bringing them in line with 
OECD guidelines (Lohse and Riedel 2013).
A second class of proposals suggests abandoning arm’s length pricing. The 
profits of multinational companies would instead be apportioned to each country 
according to some formula, perhaps using some combination of sales, capital, and 
employment—analogous to the way that corporations are taxed by the states within 
the United States (Clausing 2014, evaluates the US experience across states with 
formula apportionment). For instance, if Google makes half of its sales and has half 
of its capital and workers in the United States, then half of its profits would be taxable 
there. This method would address the issue of artificial profit shifting. If capital and 
employment entered the formula, there would remain incentives for firms to move 
real activity to low-tax countries. A more radical proposal thus allocates a multination-
al’s profits to each country based only on where it makes its sales. After all, a company 
like Starbucks can easily shift its headquarters to Ireland, but not its customers. Profit 
apportionment based on sales would therefore address both artificial profit shifting 
and tax competition. Yet sales, capital, or employment, are only mildly correlated with 
profits (Hines 2010b). So if one considers that corporate taxes ought to be paid to the 
countries from which profits originate—the third key League of Nations principle—
then formula apportionment would misattribute taxing rights.
A third class of proposals abandons source-based taxation. If the corporate tax 
is only a prepayment for the personal income tax, profits should not be attributed 
to the countries from which they originate, or where sales are made, but to the 
countries where shareholders live. To understand the differences here, imagine 
that a French resident fully owns a company that has all its capital and employment 
in Germany but sells all its products in China. In today’s tax system, all the taxing 
rights are allocated to Germany, because that is where production occurs. With 
formula apportionment based on sales, the corporate taxes would be allocated to 
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China. If one regards the corporate tax as essentially a prepayment for the French 
income tax, then with a French owner the profits should be attributed to France. 
However, the corporate tax is more than a prepayment: it is also a way to tax rents, 
like in the case of extractive industries; and foreign shareholders (French-owners 
of a Berlin-based firm, for example) benefit from the public goods provided by 
Germany, giving Germany a right to tax at least part of the profits made there. 
Clearly, source-based taxation has some legitimacy.
Rather than abandoning source-based taxation altogether, its pitfalls can be 
addressed by integrating the corporate and individual income taxes, like European 
countries used to do and countries like Australia and Canada, among others, still 
do. In this system, once profits are paid out to shareholders, the government allows 
any corporate tax previously withheld to be credited against the amount of personal 
income tax owed. Imagine that Microsoft had managed to avoid taxation entirely: in 
an imputation system, its shareholders would get no credits and pay up to 48 percent 
(the combined federal corporate tax and top dividend tax rate on $1 of corporate 
profit in 2013) on the dividends they receive. Any dollar paid by Microsoft would 
reduce the tax bill at the shareholder level. Such an imputation system combines 
source- and shareholder-based taxation in the most logical way, and, most impor-
tant, removes incentives for firms to relocate to Ireland or shift profits to Bermuda, 
since shareholders would recognize that it’s a wash.
Shareholders could still eschew taxation by investing in firms paying little or no 
dividends, and so it would remain important to ensure that large enough amounts 
of taxes are withheld at the corporate level. A number of multinational companies 
have low effective tax rates today, but this problem could probably be addressed by 
abandoning arm’s length pricing and using an apportionment formula instead. In 
an imputation system, it does not matter that sales (or any of the factors entering 
in the formula) are uncorrelated to profits, since the corporate tax is eventually 
credited back to shareholders. What matters is that the corporate tax be levied at 
approximately the same rate for large and small, high-tech, and manufacturing 
companies alike, and that this prepayment be fairly distributed across countries.
The imputation system worked well in Europe during most of the 20th century, 
but ultimately failed for two reasons. First, it became apparent that shareholders 
received credits for taxes that had never been paid in the first place, because credits 
were given on the assumption that corporations had paid the nominal rate while 
they often had paid less. This problem could be easily addressed by asking corpora-
tions to disclose their effective tax rate at the time they distribute dividends. The 
more fundamental issue is that governments found it unacceptable to give credits 
to domestic shareholders for corporate taxes levied by foreign countries, an issue 
that became important with the surge of cross-border dividend flows in the 1990s 
and 2000s. In 2004, the European Court of Justice ruled that the uneven treat-
ment of foreign dividends was discriminatory, leading France, among others, to 
abandon its imputation system in 2005 (Graetz and Warren 2007). Today, a main 
challenge is to find a way to make an integrated individual–corporate tax work in a 
globalized world.
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A World Financial Registry
The United States could thoroughly reform its corporate taxation system 
without a lot of international cooperation. For example, the United States could 
unilaterally abandon arm’s length pricing, tax corporations on their global profits 
(using some apportionment formula), raise the personal dividend tax rate, and 
credit corporate taxes back to shareholders—and do all of this in a revenue neutral 
way. In particular, instead of giving a credit to US multinationals for previously 
paid foreign taxes upon repatriation (at a cost of $118 billion in 2010), the federal 
government would give a credit to shareholders receiving foreign dividends. The 
United States might be reluctant to take such a step if foreign countries do not 
reciprocate, but this issue could be dealt with through bilateral treaties.
The European Union and the United States—which together account for close 
to 50 percent of world GDP—are currently engaged in talks to create a transatlantic 
free-trade area; as part of these talks, they could jointly decide to move to formula 
apportionment and an integrated individual–corporate tax with reciprocal cred-
iting. During the transition, the United States could also unilaterally tax the stock 
of unrepatriated offshore profits of US-owned firms, at say a 1  percent rate per 
year. This tax on corporate wealth would trigger virtuous behavioral responses: at a 
minimum it would generate extra tax revenues which could be used to cut distor-
tionary taxes or lower the tax burden of the middle class; on top of this, it might also 
spur employment and investment in the United States.
Many observers believe that taxing rights are badly allocated across countries 
today; for instance, that Google and Starbucks dodge their tax duties to the UK or 
French governments, or that both Europe and the United States deprive developing 
countries from their fair share of revenues. In itself, formula apportionment would 
not necessarily help, as evidence suggests that the allocation of taxable income across 
countries is very sensitive to the choice of the apportionment factors (IMF 2014, 
p. 39–40), and there is no guarantee, therefore, that a fair distribution is achieved. For 
example, an apportionment based on sales only may be detrimental to developing 
countries where companies produce goods for export and sale elsewhere. Tax policy 
in this area needs a benchmark—what would be a fair distribution of corporate tax 
revenues across countries?—and a tool to assess whether the benchmark is met.
One reasonable benchmark is that governments primarily want to tax the corpo-
rate profits—whether originating from domestic or foreign firms—that accrue to 
resident households, in particular because they attempt to redistribute income from 
high- to low- income people, like in the canonical model of optimal income taxation. 
There might be reasons for deviating from this benchmark (in particular for devel-
oping countries), but it is a useful and well-defined starting point.
With regard to the tool, a world financial registry would enable countries to 
assess how the actual distribution of revenues compares to the benchmark alloca-
tion. The registry would include information on the residence and nationality of 
corporate shareholders, thus making it possible for countries to check whether the 
total taxes they levy on corporate profits—at both the corporate and shareholder 
level, net of credits—are in line with the corporate profits that indeed accrue to 
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resident taxpayers. A world financial registry is not necessary to fix some of the most 
pressing issues, but in the long run it is a transparent way to enforce a fair distribu-
tion of corporate tax revenue globally and thus make an imputation system work in 
a globalized world.
Is a world financial registry workable? There are a number of practical obsta-
cles: toward the end of the paper, I will also touch on some political obstacles like 
concerns over privacy.
First, a world financial registry would have costs—but such costs should not be 
overstated. In each country, a central securities depository already keeps track of 
who owns the equities and bonds issued by domestic firms (the Depository Trust 
Corporation in the United States, for example, or Clearstream, in Luxembourg). 
A global registry would merge these partial, privately managed registries to create a 
comprehensive one.
Second, a large fraction of the world’s equities might not initially be attributable to 
any well-identified beneficial owner. Equities are largely held through intertwined finan-
cial intermediaries, like investment funds, pension funds, and the like. To identify the 
residence of the ultimate owner, it would be necessary to know the relationships of 
the different entities involved in the wealth-holding chain. Progress has started in this 
area since the recent financial crisis, under the auspices of a committee of authorities 
from around the world working to create a global system of legal entity identification: 
for some details, see the website of the Regulatory Oversight Committee (ROC) of the 
Global Legal Entity Identifier System at http://www.leiroc.org.
Third, a growing fraction of US equities (and equities in other high-income 
countries) are managed by intermediaries located in offshore financial centers. 
Figure 6 reports data collected by the US Treasury on the residence of the owners of 
US equities; the US Treasury International Capital dataset is a high-quality dataset 
and one of the main pillars of US international statistics (Bertaut, Griever, and 
Tryon 2006). In 2013, 9 percent of all US-listed equities belonged to tax-haven-based 
individuals and firms, such as hedge funds in the Cayman Islands, insurance compa-
nies in Bermuda, Luxembourg mutual funds, Swiss banks, and so on. Who are the 
ultimate owners of the shares managed by these intermediaries? Some of them 
are investors who make legal use of offshore intermediaries. But many, as the next 
section discusses, are individuals using offshore banks to evade taxes. To pierce this 
veil of secrecy, international cooperation would be necessary, which might involve 
sanctions against tax havens that are reluctant to disclose information about foreign 
customers and their accounts.
Offshore Tax Evasion by Wealthy Individuals
Switzerland, Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Bahamas, among others, have 
attracted a large offshore private banking industry. Banks located in these countries 
cater to wealthy individuals from around the world. They provide a variety of finan-
cial services to these individuals, many of which are legal and useful to people who 
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are sometimes working or living abroad or do not have access to high-quality finan-
cial services in their home country. As long as earnings from such bank accounts 
are reported to tax authorities (in the United States, using the electronic Foreign 
Bank and Financial Account form if the account value is $10,000 or more), such 
accounts are legal. However, the amount of funds in offshore accounts seems far 
larger than can be accounted for by typical banking transactions. Another service 
offshore banks can provide is the opportunity to evade taxes.
Eight Percent of the World’s Financial Wealth
To understand how offshore banking can affect an individual’s tax bill, think 
of an American businessman, Maurice, who owns a carpet-making company, Dallas 
Carpet. In order to send funds offshore, Maurice proceeds in three steps. He first 
creates a shell company, say in the Cayman Islands. Although the Cayman Islands 
appear often in these kinds of stories, Findley, Nielson, and Sharman (2012) report 
it is even easier to form anonymous companies in the state of Delaware and in many 
OECD countries. The Caribbean shell then opens a bank account in Hong Kong, 
where all the major global banks operate. Last, Dallas Carpet purchases services that 
are difficult or impossible to observe—like management advice—from the Cayman 
company and pays for the services by wiring funds to Hong Kong. The bank earns 
fees, thus making it a good deal for Hong Kong to allow such accounts to exist; 
incorporation agents in the Caymans also earn fees.
Figure 6 
US Equities Held by Tax Haven Firms and Individuals
Source: Author’s computations using US Treasury International Capital data. See online Appendix. 
Notes: In 2012, 9 percent of the US listed equity capitalization was held by tax haven investors (hedge funds 
in the Cayman Islands, banks in Switzerland, mutual finds in Luxembourg, individuals in Monaco, etc.)
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The transaction generates a paper trail that appears legitimate, and in at least 
some cases actually is legitimate. It is unlikely to trigger any anti-money-laundering 
alarms inside the banks because there are billions of electronic transfers out of the 
United States each year, making it is almost impossible to distinguish in real time 
those that are legal (such as payments made to real exporters) from those condu-
cive to tax evasion.
For Maurice, the tax benefits of this arrangement are twofold. By overpaying 
for actual services, or just paying for false services, he (fraudulently) reduces Dallas 
Carpet’s profits and thus its corporate tax in the United States. Then, once the 
funds have arrived in Hong Kong, they can be invested in global bonds, equities, 
and mutual funds and generate interest, dividends, and capital gains. The IRS can 
only tax that income if Maurice self-reports it, or if Hong Kong banks inform the US 
authorities. Otherwise, Maurice can evade US federal income tax as well.
How big are the sums held in offshore accounts? Until recently, evidence 
on that issue was lacking. Tax havens rarely publish informative statistics. There 
are two  exceptions, however. Thanks to an exhaustive, detailed, monthly survey 
conducted by the Swiss National Bank, we know the amount of wealth held by 
foreigners in Switzerland. The latest data point, for June 2014, puts the total at 
$2.46 trillion.7 Luxembourg has also recently released similar information, showing 
that foreign households have $370 billion there (Adam 2014, p. 8).8 (Luxembourg, 
a country of half a million inhabitants, has an annual national income of about 
$35 billion.) But no other country publishes similar data. The United States, for 
example, does not disclose the assets held by, say, Latin American residents in 
Florida banks.
To obtain a sense of the global amount of offshore wealth, one has to use indi-
rect methods. My own attempt relies on the anomalies in global investment statistics 
caused by offshore fortunes (Zucman 2013a, 2013b). Take the hypothetical case of 
Elizabeth, a UK resident who owns stock in Google through her Swiss account. In 
the United States, statisticians observe that a foreign investor owns US  securities 
and record a liability. UK statisticians should record an asset held by a UK resident 
but they don’t, because they have no way to observe Elizabeth’s offshore holdings. 
Because Elizabeth’s equity holdings are neither assets nor liabilities for Switzerland, 
over there nothing is recorded in the investment statistics. In the end, more liabili-
ties than assets show up in global investment data. Strikingly, more than 20 percent 
of the world’s cross-border equities have no identifiable owner.
By analyzing these anomalies, I estimate that 8 percent of the global financial 
wealth of households is held in tax havens, about $7.6 trillion at the end of 2013. 
Other estimates are generally larger. Based on interviews with wealth managers, the 
Boston Consulting Group (2014) has an $8.9 trillion figure for 2013. Henry’s (2012) 
estimate is as high as $32 trillion.
7 For details, see Table S1 of the online Appendix to this article.
8 This figure understates the true amount of offshore wealth in Luxembourg because it excludes some 
$350 billion not directly held by households but through family offices and other intermediaries.
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My method probably delivers a lower bound, in part because it only captures 
financial wealth and disregards real assets. After all, high-net-worth individuals 
can stash works of art, jewelry, and gold in “freeports,” warehouses that serve as 
repositories for valuables—Geneva, Luxembourg, and Singapore all have them. 
High-net-worth individuals also own real estate in foreign countries. Registry data 
show that a large chunk of London’s luxury real estate is held through shell compa-
nies, largely domiciled in the British Virgin Islands, a scheme that enables owners 
to remain anonymous and to exploit tax loopholes (O’Murchu 2014). There is no 
way yet to estimate the value of such real assets held abroad.
The world’s offshore wealth is large enough to significantly affect measures of 
the inequality of wealth. As shown by Table 1, US residents own about $1.2 trillion 
abroad, the equivalent of 4  percent of America’s financial wealth. Europe holds 
$2.6  trillion offshore, which is about 10 percent of its financial assets. The wide-
spread use of tax havens means that survey and tax data probably underestimate the 
concentration of wealth substantially (see Roine and Waldenström 2009 for the case 
of Sweden). In developing countries, the fraction of wealth held abroad is consider-
able, ranging from 20 to 30 percent in many African and Latin American countries 
to as much as 50 percent in Russia and Gulf countries.
How is offshore wealth evolving? In Switzerland, foreign holdings are close to 
an all-time high. They have increased 4.6 percent per year since the Swiss National 
Bank started publishing data at the end of 1998. The trend does not seem to have 
been much affected by recent enforcement efforts. In an April 2009 summit, the 
leaders of the G20 countries declared the “end of bank secrecy” ( Johannesen and 
Zucman 2014). Since then, offshore assets managed in Switzerland have increased 
15 percent. Adam (2014) similarly reports a 20 percent growth for Luxembourg 
offshore wealth from 2008 to 2012 (the latest available data). The growth is 
Table 1 
The World’s Offshore Financial Wealth
Offshore wealth  
($ billions)
Share of financial  
wealth held offshore
Tax revenue loss 
($ billions)
Europe 2,600 10% 75
United States 1,200 4% 36
Asia 1,300 4% 35
Latin America 700 22% 21
Africa 500 30% 15
Canada 300 9% 6
Russia 200 50% 1
Gulf countries 800 57% 0
Total 7,600 8.0% 190
Source: Author’s computations (see Zucman 2013a, b) and online Appendix.
Notes: Offshore wealth includes financial assets only (equities, bonds, mutual 
fund shares, and bank deposits). Tax revenue losses only include the evasion of 
personal income taxes on investment income earned offshore as well as evasion 
of wealth, inheritance, and estate taxes.
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stronger in the emerging Asian centers, Singapore and Hong Kong, so that globally, 
according to my estimate, offshore wealth has increased 28 percent from end-2008 
to end-2013.
The post-2008 growth in offshore wealth reflects both valuation effects—world 
equity markets have largely recovered from their trough in 2008 and 2009—and also 
net new inflows. In the case of Luxembourg, the 20 percent growth in offshore assets 
is despite a 20 percent drop in the EuroStoxx 500, Europe’s leading equity index. In 
Switzerland, the 15 percent growth since April 2009 is comparable to the growth of 
Europe’s financial wealth. Inflows seem to be coming largely from developing coun-
tries; as their share of global wealth rises, so too does their share of offshore wealth. 
More than half of offshore assets still belong to residents of high-income countries 
(as shown in Table 1), but if the current trend is sustained, emerging countries will 
overtake Europe and North America by the end of the decade.
Two other recent developments are worth noting. First, while offshore assets 
are rising, the number of clients is falling, and so the average wealth per client 
is booming. The main Swiss banks have been refocusing their activities on their 
“key private banking” clients, those with more than $50 million in assets. Recent 
policy changes (discussed below) are indeed making it more difficult for moder-
ately wealthy individuals to use offshore banks to dodge taxes: for them, the era 
of bank secrecy is coming to an end. But more fundamentally, offshore banks are 
responding to the increasing concentration of global fortunes.9 The banks know 
that “ultra-high net worth” clients are prospering—a number of them publish 
annual world wealth reports in which fortunes of dozens of millions of dollars are 
described as rising much faster than average and are projected to continue to do so 
in the future (for example, Credit Suisse 2013).
Offshore banking is also becoming more sophisticated. Wealthy individuals 
increasingly use shell companies, trusts, holdings, and foundations as nominal 
owners of their assets. This is apparent in Switzerland, where more than 60 percent of 
foreign-owned deposits “belong” to the British Virgin Islands, Jersey, and Panama—
the leading centers for the domiciliation of shell vehicles. In Luxembourg as well, 
“assets are moving to legal structures such as family wealth-holding companies” 
(Adam 2014, p. 8).
The revenue costs of offshore tax dodging are sizable. Of course, some 
taxpayers duly declare their Swiss or Cayman holdings. Yet in Switzerland, about 
80 percent of the wealth held by Europeans seems to be evading taxes, according to 
data published by the Swiss tax authority. On the assumption of a like basis for other 
tax havens, Table 1 provides estimates of the revenue losses for the main economies. 
Globally, the reduction in tax revenues amount to about $200 billion annually. This 
9 In Saez and Zucman (2014), wealth is estimated by capitalizing flows of capital income. By this measure, 
the share of US wealth held by the top 0.1 percent—families with more than $20 million in net wealth 
in 2012—was 8 percent in 1980; it is now 22 percent and as much as 23 percent when making allowance 
for unrecorded offshore assets. For the top 0.01 percent (those holding more than $100 million), the 
rise has been spectacular, from less than 3 to more than 11 percent of all wealth. By contrast, households 
between the top 10 percent and the top 0.1 percent have seen their share of total US wealth decrease.
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is about 1 percent of the total revenues raised by governments worldwide, and this 
reduction in tax revenues accrues almost entirely to the wealthiest. In the United 
States, according to IRS data, the top 0.1 percent highest income earners pay about 
$200 billion in federal income taxes (16 percent of all federal income tax revenues, 
which totaled $1.3 trillion in 2013). Assuming that all unrecorded offshore wealth 
belongs to the top 0.1 percent, eradicating offshore evasion (which would yield at 
least $36 billion) would raise as much revenues as increasing the top 0.1 percent’s 
federal income tax bill by close to 18 percent. (These computations only include 
the cost of tax evasion on investment income earned offshore and on inheritances.) 
As with any attempt at quantifying unreported aspects of the economy, a 
margin of error is involved. While it seems clear that global offshore wealth is 
on the rise, the main uncertainty relates to the fraction of those funds that evade 
taxes. A couple of US Senate (2008, 2014) reports found that up to 2008, 85 to 
95 percent of US-owned accounts at UBS and Credit Suisse were undeclared. Thus, 
my assumption that 80 percent of offshore funds is undeclared to tax authorities 
suggests that some improvement has been made in recent years. Some observers 
believe that enforcement has improved much more dramatically, but this view 
is inconsistent with the fact that the funds declared to tax authorities in recent 
years, though not negligible, have been quite modest ( Johannesen and Zucman 
2014, Section V). The share of offshore wealth that is dodging taxes may decrease 
more substantially in the future. To compute it, we would ideally like to compare 
the data published by the Swiss National Bank (and other tax haven authorities) 
to the assets that taxpayers report to the IRS (and other tax agencies). But very 
few havens publish any useful statistics and tax authorities do not systematically 
disclose the amounts declared to them. Filling in these data gaps should be among 
the highest priorities in this area for researchers and policymakers.
The Automatic Exchange of Bank Information and Beyond
Since the financial crisis of 2008–2009, remarkable progress has been achieved in 
curbing bank secrecy. Prior to 2008, tax havens refused to share any information with 
foreign tax authorities. But in 2010, the US Congress enacted and President Obama 
signed into law the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, which compels foreign 
banks to disclose accounts held by US taxpayers to the IRS automatically each year, 
under the threat of economic sanctions—a 30 percent tax on all US-source income 
(Grinberg 2012). Other high-income countries are following suit, as discussed in 
OECD (2014), and the automatic sharing of bank data is becoming the global stan-
dard. Key havens, including Switzerland, Singapore, and Luxembourg, have already 
indicated they would participate. In 2008, the vast majority of tax experts would have 
deemed such worldwide cooperation utopian. Apparently, tax havens can be forced 
to cooperate if threatened with large enough penalties.
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act has been criticized on a number of 
grounds: for example, it asserts US government power over foreign-based financial 
firms; it invades privacy; and it creates difficulties for ordinary Americans overseas 
because foreign banks may choose simply not to offer or to sharply limit accounts 
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to Americans rather than to deal with its requirements. Whatever the merits and 
demerits of these issues, FATCA has been the starting point toward changing the 
ground rules that previously governed offshore banking.
However, current enforcement efforts face three main potential obstacles: 
1) obtaining compliance from offshore bankers, 2) addressing the opacity of inter-
national financial record-keeping, 3) making sure offshore banking does not move 
to uncovered jurisdictions.
With regard to the first concern, not all bankers in Switzerland, the Caymans, 
and elsewhere may truthfully report to foreign authorities. For decades, some 
of them have been hiding their clients behind shell companies, smuggling 
diamonds in toothpaste tubes, and handing out bank statements concealed in 
sports magazines, all of this in violation of the law and the banks’ stated policies 
(as reported in US Senate, 2008, 2014). More than a handful of rogue employees 
were involved: in 2008, over 1,800  Credit Suisse bankers were servicing Swiss 
accounts for US customers. Can offshore wealth managers now be trusted to assist 
the tax authorities?
Securing their cooperation will partly depend on the penalties that financiers 
will face for noncompliance and the rewards that whistleblowers will be able to 
claim. In the United States, the IRS has paid as much as $104 million to the employee 
who denounced wrongdoings at UBS. The Justice Department has imposed fines 
for abuses of offshore banking, and regulators have threatened to revoke banking 
charters a number of times over the last years. However, the US approach has also 
been weak in some ways, according to a bipartisan US Senate staff report (2014). 
While the US has put pressure on Switzerland, it has largely failed so far to pressure 
other tax havens.10 Among the US taxpayers who have voluntarily disclosed previ-
ously hidden assets in recent years, 42 percent reported a Swiss account, 8 percent 
a UK account, but almost no US taxpayers reported any holdings in Hong Kong 
(3 percent), the Caymans (1 percent), or Singapore (1 percent), where the bulk 
of US offshore money lies (Government Accountability Office, 2013b, 2014). Only 
about one-quarter of the funds that left Credit Suisse between 2008 and 2012 have 
been repatriated to the United States, while half have stayed in Switzerland, and the 
remaining quarter have moved to other countries (US Senate 2014, p. 114). As for 
other rich economies, the European Union has about 30 times more wealth hidden 
in Switzerland than the United States, yet has done much less than the United States 
to fight this type of evasion.
Looking forward, countries unwilling or unable to impose sanctions on offshore 
banks and reward informants about systematic legal violations will remain vulner-
able—this includes nations with corrupt governments, small economies, most of the 
10 As of August 2014, only two banks (Wegelin and Credit Suisse) had been indicted, and the United 
States had obtained few names and little account information: Credit Suisse sent less than 1 percent of 
its 22,000 American accountholders; Wegelin, none. Accounts disclosed have also tended to be small, 
with a median amount of $570,000. Overall, just $6 billion in back taxes, interest, and penalties had been 
paid with regard to offshore bank accounts by January/February 2014—which pales in comparison to 
the yearly losses for the IRS.
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developing world, and, as it stands, the European Union. Another important factor 
will be the evolution of the size distribution of banks. Whistleblowing by rational (or 
moral) employees is more likely to occur in big than small firms (Kleven, Kreiner, 
and Saez 2009). If tax evasion activities move to small boutique banks, shielded from 
US outreach, then enforcement might prove increasingly difficult. Even some large 
banks may straggle in a way that hinders enforcement, if they believe that they are 
too big to indict—that is, they believe that regulators will hesitate to charge them 
because it might pose a danger to financial stability. In 2014, Credit Suisse pleaded 
guilty of a criminal charge of conspiracy to defraud the IRS, yet it was able to keep 
its US banking license (US Department of Justice 2014).11
With regard to the second concern, there is a fundamental problem that many 
assets cannot easily be traced to their real owners, so even the automatic sharing 
of bank information may bump into problems of financial opacity. Take the Hong 
Kong account of hypothetical Maurice, mentioned earlier: on paper, it belongs 
to a Cayman corporation managed by nominees with addresses in that country. 
Imagine that Maurice’s Hong Kong bankers enquire about who owns the Cayman 
shell company. Will they find out? Findley, Nielson, and Sharman (2012) attempted 
to create anonymous companies by asking 3,700 incorporation agents in 182 coun-
tries: in about a quarter of cases, they were able to do so without providing any 
identification document. But the problems don’t stop there. Imagine now that 
certain documents show that the Cayman company belongs to a Jersey discretionary 
trust. When asked, the trustees, who were chosen by Maurice, say the beneficial 
owner is Chang, Maurice’s business partner in China. The Hong Kong account, 
then, does not belong to a foreign person and no information is sent to the IRS. 
Even that example is much simplified. In the real world, tax evaders can combine 
countless holding entities in numerous havens, generating de jure ownerless assets 
or effectively disconnecting them from their holdings. The prevalence of deriva-
tive financial instruments can also make it difficult to discern the value of financial 
holdings clearly. Thus, even though the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act and 
similar laws are broad in scope, they may prove unable to catch even moderately 
sophisticated tax dodgers. Evasion opportunities are disappearing for those who do 
not use more complex administrative structures like shell corporations and trusts, 
but may remain for those who do.
The third concern is that a crackdown on offshore evasion needs to be global. 
Cooperative efforts coordinated through the OECD have convinced many offshore 
centers to share bank information automatically. Yet the more havens agree to coop-
erate, the bigger the incentives for the remaining ones not to do so (Elsayyad and 
Konrad 2012). In Johannesen and Zucman (2014), we show that when two coun-
tries like Switzerland and France agree to share banking information, French tax 
11 In 2012, US authorities decided against indicting HSBC despite evidence the bank enabled Mexican 
drug cartels to move money through its American subsidiaries in violation of basic anti-money-laundering 
regulations. Instead, the bank was fined $1.92  billion. For comparison, HSBC’s pre-tax profits were 
$22.6 billion in 2013.
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evaders move their assets to less-cooperative places like Hong Kong. Such transfers 
are child’s play, because the funds remain within the same banks that have subsid-
iaries all over the world. A handful of noncooperative financial centers can quickly 
attract a lot of money.
The obstacles to current enforcement actions are not insuperable, though. 
Recent experience since the G20 summit in April 2009 shows that diplomacy can go 
a long way in securing commitments from countries to encourage bank reporting 
of foreign accounts. A number of tax havens derive a large fraction of their income 
from illegal activities; at this stage they have little incentive to give up this lucra-
tive business, but global cooperation might be achieved by threatening tax havens 
with sanctions proportional to the income they generate in abetting tax dodgers. 
Such incentives may also foster cooperation on the part of the havens that have 
already promised to implement the automatic exchange of bank information. In 
addition to fines, criminal charges, and the revocation of banking licenses, cred-
ible threats include trade tariffs. A 30 percent tariff jointly imposed by Germany, 
France, and Italy on Swiss exports, for instance, would cost Switzerland more than 
what Swiss banks gain by managing the evaded wealth from these three countries 
(Zucman 2013b).
Progress can also be made in curbing financial opacity by using the world 
financial registry described above. For enforcing an efficient and fair corporate 
income tax, the world financial registry only needs to include equities. For tax 
enforcement purposes concerning individuals, it would be necessary to include 
other types of financial claims, including bank deposits, bonds, and derivatives. 
A world financial registry would make it possible for tax authorities to check that 
taxpayers duly report their assets and income, independently of what information 
offshore bankers are willing to provide. One common response to proposals for a 
world financial registry is that it would threaten individual privacy. But countries 
have public property records for land and real estate and there seems to be little 
misuse. Anybody, for example, can connect to http://a836-acris.nyc.gov/ and find 
out who owns real estate on Park Avenue (although one sometimes stumbles upon 
faceless corporate titles) or if a particular person owns anything in Brooklyn. Of 
course, these records about real estate only capture part of people’s wealth, but 
when the records were created, centuries ago (for example, in 1791 in France), 
land accounted for the bulk of private wealth, so they indeed recorded most of 
peoples’ fortunes. In addition, not all countries have the same attitudes toward 
transparency, and such attitudes change over time. In some Scandinavian coun-
tries, taxpayers’ income and wealth is made public (Bø, Slemrod, and Thoresen 
2014). Even in the United Sates, income tax payments were required to be publicly 
disclosed in 1923 and 1924 (Marcin 2014). But there might be a case for starting 
such a world financial registry only with those countries sharing similar attitudes 
toward transparency, or to initially keep the information confidentially in the 
hands of tax and regulatory authorities.
While progress has undoubtedly been achieved over the last few years in 
curbing tax avoidance and evasion, much more could be done to illuminate the 
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dark sides of international capital mobility. The stakes go beyond tax enforcement, 
as the ability to move large sums of money without leaving a footprint also facilitates 
money laundering, bribery, and the financing of terrorism.
■ I thank the editors, Annette Alstadsæter, Alan Auerbach, Kimberly Clausing, Michael 
Devereux, Jim Hines, Niels Johannesen, Edward Kleinbard, Henrik Kleven, Emmanuel Saez, 
Joel Slemrod, Danny Yagan, and Francis Weyzig for helpful comments and reactions.
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